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RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
Good Character as a
Requirement for Citizenship
The provisions of the Immigration, Nat-
uralization and Nationality Act of 1952,
better known as theMcCarran-Walter Im-
migration Act, require that an applicant
for citizenship maintain good moral char-
acter for at least five years prior to nat-
uralization.1
A recent case, In re Kielblock,2 is illus-
trative of the difficulty confronting the
courts in the application of this statutory
requirement to the facts of the individual
case. A woman petitioning the court for
citizenship admitted that she had sexual
relations with a married man within the
five years immediately preceding the peti-
tion. The Court held that these acts did not
affect the petitioner's status as a person
of good moral character. The basis of the
decision is almost impossible to pinpoint.
The Court adverts to numerous factors:
the non-adulterous nature of the acts; the
privacy which should be accorded the sat-
isfaction of sexual appetite; the absence
of aggravating circumstances; petitioner's
frank and honest admission of the acts;
the practical impossibility of divining the
dictates of the "common conscience." Other
factors are mentioned, but these suffice to
suggest that the Court appears to have
bolstered its conclusion with a series of
interesting facts which, since not directed
toward a logical inference of character, are
legally meaningless.
The Court characterizes the acts as not
166 STAT. 242, 8 U.S.C. §1427 (1952).
2 163 F. Supp. 687 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
adulterous, emphasizing that there was no
cohabitation, which is an element of the
crime of adultery in California. The Court
does not specifically mention the additional
fact that according to the California statute,
as well as the common law, only a married
person can be an adulterer.3 Petitioner was
unmarried. Hence, petitioner's actions were
not among those specifically designated by
the statute as immoral.4 Her character,
therefore, must be adjudged according to
the general tenor of the statute.,
The Court, in the Kielblock case, twice
alluded to petitioner's reputation.6 Herein
lies the basic fallacy of the Court's ratio
decidendi. Petitioner's reputation rather
than her character seems to have controlled
the decision, in spite of the fact that the
distinction between the decisive element of
character and the evidentiary factor of rep-
utation has been steadfastly maintained by
3 See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§269a, 269b (West
1955). "Adultery. Voluntary sexual intercourse of
a married person with a person other than the
offender's husband or wife." BLACK, LAW Dic-
TIONARY 71 (4th ed. 1951). "Fornication. Unlaw-
ful sexual intercourse, between two unmarried
persons. Further, if one of the persons be married
and the other not, it is fornication on the part of
the latter, though adultery for the former ... "
Id. at 781. "Adultery.... In general, it is suffi-
cient if either party is married; and the crime of
the married party will be adultery, while that of
the unmarried party will be fornication .. " 1
BouVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 149 (8th ed. 1914).
4 66 STAT. 172, 8 U.S.C. §1101 (f) (1952).
5 "The fact that any person is not within any of
the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding
that for other reasons such person is or was not of
good moral character." 66 STAT. 173, 8 U.S.C.
§1101 (f) (1952).
6 In re Kielblock, 163 F. Supp. 687, 688-89 (S.D.
Cal. 1958).
the courts.7
Character has been defined as the prin-
ciple of intelligently controlled action.8
Thus, it is an abstraction. It is manifested
in two ways which may be the object of
judicial consideration in naturalization
hearings: human conduct and reputation.9
The court's judgment of the conduct should
be compared with the testimony as to repu-
tation. Character is then to be inferred.
The "character," referred to in the immi-
gration statute, would thus be a combina-
tion of conduct and reputation.
Prior to considering decisions in similar
cases, it should be understood that serious
and heinous crimes obviously disqualify a
petitioner while minor offenses, such as traf-
fic violations, need not affect good moral
character. It seems the issue becomes
doubtful when there is no criminal offense
but the petitioner's actions are at least open
to question under generally accepted moral
standards. With reference only to this
doubtful area, it can safely be stated that
previous decisions on the question of good
moral character have been inconsistent. A
person keeping a saloon open in violation
7 Ralich v. United States, 185 F.2d 784, 786 (8th
Cir. 1950); In re Spenser, 22 Fed. Cas. 921 (No.
13234) (C.C.D. Ore. 1878); United States v.
Hrasky, 240 Ill. 560, 88 N.E. 1031, 1033 (1909)
(per curiam). "The applicant must not simply
have sustained a good reputation, but his conduct
must have been such as comports with a good
character. ... The one is the substance, the other
the shadow." In re Spenser, supra.
8 BRENNAN, GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 405 (1937).
It has also been defined as ". . . the aggregate of
a person's traits, including those relating to care
and skill and their opposites." MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE rule 304 (1942).
0 See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 305 (1942);
1 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE §52 (3d ed. 1940). In gen-
eral, there are three types of character evidence:
conduct, reputation and opinion. For the purpose
of this discussion of naturalization proceedings,
opinion evidence is classed within the scope of
general reputation.
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of Sunday laws was denied naturalization, 0
whereas another was granted naturalization
in the same situation." Moreover, an indi-
vidual who had slot machines in violation
of law, plus two liquor violations at his
saloon, was considered to be of good moral
character. 12 An adulterous way of living
was held acceptable in some cases;' 3 in
another it was deemed ground for disquali-
fication, 14 even when followed by mar-
riage.'r A single act of adultery has been
held to prevent naturalization;' 6 it has also
10 United States v. Gerstein, 284 Ill. 174, 119 N.E.
922 (1918); United States v. Hrasky, 240 Il1. 560,
88 N.E. 1031 (1909) (per curiam). The tenor of
both cases, in which the fact-patterns were essen-
tially identical, was that even the slightest offense,
be it malum prohibitum or malum in se, vitiated
the petitioner's claim to good moral character.
1'In re Hopp, 179 Fed. 561 (E.D. Wis. 1910).
The court distinguished the Hrasky case, supra
note 10, on the ground that in that case only the
back door was open, while in the Hopp case the
front door was left open, displaying an "honest"
violation of law. Id. at 563.
12 Petition of Gani, 86 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. La.
1949). The entire decision is based on his good
reputation and the acceptability of his conduct to
the community.
18 Application of Murra, 178 F.2d 670 (7th Cir.
1949); Petition of Rudder, 159 F.2d 695 (2d Cir.
1947). In the latter case, because four couples,
living in adultery, were unable to marry due to
legal impediments, and because all had main-
tained "long-term" and "faithful" relationships,
they were adjudged of good moral character.
14 Petition of Pacora, 96 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
15 Petition of F- --- G----, 137 F. Supp.
782 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The specification of adul-
tery as immoral which appeared in the 1952 act
was held declarative of public policy and con-
trolled this case, which was decided under the
1940 act.
16 Estrin v. United States, 80 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.
1935). The reason for the decision was that
petitioner offered no explanation or mitigating
circumstances. It is fairly probable that in the
interval between this decision and the characteri-
zation of adultery as immoral in the 1952 act,
few petitioners were caught without ready excuses
for any prior indiscretion.
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been held not to prevent naturalization. 7
Misstatement of name on entry into the
country has, in one instance, been held to
be a disqualifying action,' and, in another,
a non-disqualifying action.' 9 The reason
behind these inconsistencies may well be
that the test applied is not uniform,20 except
insofar as it delegates to the community
and the "average citizen" a task solely judi-
17 United States v. Palombella, 168 F.2d 903 (3d
Cir. 1948) (per curiam). Facts of this case are
mentioned in Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d
450 (2d Cir. 1949).
1s In re Zycholc, 43 F.2d 438 (E.D. Mich. 1930).
19 In re Liebowitz, 49 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Ill.
1943). The fact that the name had been used for
some time prior to its being used on entry was
felt to distinguish the case from one involving
fraud.
20 Chief Judge Learned Hand, speaking of the
practicality of ascertaining the conscience of the
community: "The situation is one in which to
proceed by any available method would not be
more likely to satisfy the impalpable standard,
deliberately chosen, than that we adopted in the
foregoing cases: that is, to resort to our own con-
jecture, fallible as we recognize it to be." Schmidt
v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir.
1949). "In determining the character of a peti-
tioner for naturalization the facts and circum-
stances in each case must be weighed in the light
of generally accepted standards of morality ....
not [necessarily] . . . 'moral excellence' [but] ...
good moral character up to the standard of the
average citizen." Petition of Gani, 86 F. Supp.
683, 685-86 (W.D. La. 1949). "What standard
does the statute contemplate? It is plain that it
does not require the highest degree of moral
excellence. A good moral character is one that
measures . . . up to the standard of the average
citizen. . . . So here, where the law says a good
moral character, it means such a reputation as
will pass muster with the average man. It need
not rise above the level of the common mass of
people." In re Hopp, 179 Fed. 561, 562-63 (E.D.
Wis. 1910). "The standard may vary from one
generation to another, and probably the average
man of the country is as high as it can be set."
In re Spenser, 22 Fed. Cas. 921 (No. 13234)
(C.C.D. Ore. 1878). (Emphasis added in all quo-
tations.) See also Note, 16 U. Cm. L. REv. 138
(1948).
cial.21 The test has become more of a shield
to avoid judgment upon another's moral
character than a sword to use in separating
the acceptable from the unacceptable. 22 It
is to be noted that the courts which are
stricter concerning good moral character
seem to concentrate on the conduct as-
pect of character, while others appear to
weigh reputation in the community more
heavily.2 3
The cases discussed above may well
have been correctly decided in view of the
circumstances and the personalities of the
individual applicants. Yet, in any objective
synthesis, they could hardly be reconciled.
A remedy for the situation might be to
adopt a test which would set up an objec-
tive norm but leave sufficient judicial lati-
tude to encompass mitigating or aggravat-
ing circumstances. One possible test would
be to answer the following question con-
cerning petitioner's behavior: Are peti-
tioner's conduct and reputation indicative
of the character of a person probably inca-
pable of assuming the duties of citizen-
ship? In no event should the inscrutable
and non-existent test of "community con-
21 See Cahn, Authority and Responsibility, 51
COLUM. L. REv. 838 (1951); Note, Judicial De-
termination of Good Moral Character, 5 J. PUB.
L. 504 (1956).
22 See Cahn, supra note 21, at 840-41. Compare
the following statement from a recent case which
emphasizes the progressive decline in moral stand-
ards: "A more liberal view of sexual behavior
has been taken by the courts in the past decade
when passing on the moral character of petitioners
for naturalization .... This court also recognizes
the rather liberal attitude taken by the public in
the United States of adultery, seduction, rape,
and other equally intriguing human aberrations.
Yet we must not forget that our civilization is
built around a family relation which should be
kept as sacred as possible if we are not to become
an amoral people." Petition of Anzalone, 107 F.
Supp. 770, 771 (D.N.J. 1952) (dictum).
28 See notes 10-19, supra.
science" be applied.2 4
The test suggested would still attain the
desideratum of selectivity in admission to
citizenship. Those applying it would have
to keep in mind certain considerations.
First, citizenship is a privilege, and not a
right.25 Second, any doubt must be resolved
in favor of the government. 20 Third, the
result to be attained is benefit to the nation
rather than charity to the petitioner.27 It is
true that great contributions are not to be
expected in every case, but constructive
citizenship can and does mean more than
mere fulfillment of the minimum legal obfi-
gations. The final and prime consideration
under this test would be whether the con-
duct, though it fell short of crime,28 had
24 See Cahn, supra note 21, at 843-47. Cf. Schmidt
v. United States, note 20 supra.
25 See Brukiewicz v. Savoretti, 211 F.2d 541, 543
(5th Cir. 1954); Ralich v. United States, 185 F.2d
784, 786 (8th Cir. 1950); In re Nosen, 49 F.2d
817, 818 (D. Wash. 1931).
26 See United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467
(1928); Petition of Gani, 86 F. Supp. 683, 685
(W.D. La. 1949); In re McNeil, 14 F. Supp. 394,
395 (N.D. Cal. 1936).
27 "The citizenship of the country is sufficiently
alloyed and debased by the presence of immoral
natives without the addition of those born in for-
eign countries." In re Spenser, 22 Fed. Cas. 921
(No. 13234) (C.C.D. Ore. 1878). See Ohlson,
Moral Character and the Naturalization Act, 13
B.U.L. REV. 636, 642 (1933), wherein a strong
argument for greater selectivity in granting citizen-
ship is presented.
28 "The court is called upon to use a different set
of scales in weighing conduct on a petition for
naturalization from those used in weighing con-
duct in a criminal case. Conduct may not be suf-
ficiently bad to justify criminal prosecution and
still fall far short of being good enough to reward
with citizenship. We are not ... dealing with the
question of enforcing the criminal law, but with
the question of whether or not this petitioner has
earned, by his conduct, the high reward of citizen-
ship .. " Petition of Nybo, 34 F.2d 161, 163
(E.D. Mich. 1929), aff'd, 42 F.2d 727 (6th Cir.
1930).
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such a social tendency as would indicate
the character of a person unable or unwill-
ing to perform the duties of citizenship.
The result reached in the Kielblock29
case may have been correct. The reason-
ing of the Court, however, appears open
to criticism. The conduct aspect of the
actions in question is almost ignored be-
cause not criminal. The fact that such con-
duct is inimical to our domestic institutions
is not mentioned and the Court almost
reaches the point of implicit condonation.
The reputation of petitioner is, on the other
hand, overemphasized and accorded con-
trolling weight. The Court does not discuss
whether the social tendencies of petitioner's
behavior indicate a person of "good moral
character" - a person who would make a
good citizen.
The Paroled Alien's Right
to a Deportation Hearing
While Russian heavy tanks were crush-
ing their way into Budapest in October
1956, thousands of Hungarians fled across
the border into Austria in a desperate at-
tempt to escape annihilation. In order to
aid these refugees, the President issued a
proclamation dispensing quota requirements
and allowing 32,000 Hungarian immi-
grants to be paroled into the United States
without visas. Subsequently one of these,
Gyula Paktorovics, was scheduled to be
deported without a hearing because he did
not possess an entry visa. In granting Pak-
torovics' request for a hearing, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
that the refugee Hungarians represented a
unique class of parolees, and as such were
entitled to the benefits of constitutional due
29 163 F. Supp. 687 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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process.'
The impact of this decision can only be
appreciated when viewed against the back-
ground of the established American legal
policy toward immigration. The reported
cases in this field have observed a basic
dichotomy of alien classification: the alien
present within the United States as a resi-
dent, and the alien who is still on foreign
soil while seeking admission to the coun-
try.2 The difference in the treatment of the
two classes is elemental and yet far-reaching;
the former class is entitled to the protection
of constitutional due process, 3 the latter is
not.4 This distinction is significant in the
instant case because, under the doctrine of
parole, an alien physically present within
the United States is treated as being still
on foreign soil. Parole into the United
States does not constitute presence within
the country as far as constitutional protec-
tion is concerned. 5
A recognition of this difference has re-
' United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 260
F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1958). Part of the President's
message on the Hungarian refugee problem is as
follows: "The eyes of the free world have been
fixed on Hungary over the past 2 months.
Thousands of men, women, and children have fled
their homes to escape Communist oppression.
They seek asylum in countries that are free. Their
opposition to Communist tyranny is evidence of a
growing resistance throughout the world. Our
position of world leadership demands that, in
partnership with the other nations of the free
world, we be in a position to grant that asylum."
1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 756.
2 See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185
(1958); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956);
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
3 See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86
(1903); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
4 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537 (1950).
5 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
sulted in two separate legal proceedings for
the removal of undesired aliens. "Exclu-
sion" prevents an alien from entering the
United States when he is either actually
outside its borders or, under the doctrine
of parole, is treated as being so. "Expul-
sion" forces out of the United States an
alien who is a resident of this country. 6
The exclusion and expulsion of aliens is a
basic power of Congress, 7 but in the case
of a resident alien the power is not arbi-
trary.8 The fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments are not confined to the protection of
citizens, but apply to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction.9 Therefore, it is be-
yond the power of any executive officer to
cause a resident alien to be taken into cus-
tody and deported without giving him
ample opportunity to be heard on the issues
involving his right to remain in the United
States.10 The alien has become a part of
the population by his residence, and no
arbitrary deportation can be allowed against
him." Although it may later be established
that the alien can be expelled and deported,
during the expulsion proceedings he is en-
titled to notice of the nature of the charge
and a hearing before an executive or admin-
istrative tribunal.' 2
In the case of an excluded alien the situ-
6 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596
n. 4 (1953).
7 See United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194
U.S. 279 (1904); The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581 (1889).
8 See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86
(1903).
9 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886);
Coyler v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass.
1920), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Skeffing-
ton v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (1st Cir. 1922).
10 The Japanese Immigrant Case, supra note 8.
11 Ibid.
12 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590,
597 (1953).
ation is quite different. An alien who is a
stranger to our shores brings with him no
constitutional rights; Congress may exclude
him for whatever reason it thinks fit, and
may do so without due process. The Bill
of Rights is futile authority for an alien
who is seeking admission. 1" The denial of
due process to an entering alien is logically
applied to a paroled alien since the latter
is fictively considered to be outside the
United States.14 He is considered as being
stopped at the border, and the parole is
merely to save him the inconvenience of
remaining aboard ship. 15 The adherence
to this doctrine has been strict. Paroled
Chinese citizens have been denied a hear-
ing before being excluded, even though
their deportation might result in physical
persecution and death. "The authorities
seem to be well settled that parole into the
United States of an excludable alien ...
does not constitute an entry."' 16
The rigidity of the parole doctrine was
early upheld by Mr. Justice Holmes in the
Kaplan case. 17 A thirteen-year-old Russian
girl had been found by immigration authori-
ties to be feeble-minded and was, for that
reason, ordered excluded. Before the order
could be executed World War I began. The
child was placed with an immigrant aid
society which allowed her to live with her
father. As late as 1923, after her father
had become a naturalized citizen, a warrant
Is Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953). See also Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (concurring opinion).
14 United States ex rel. Lue Chow Yee v. Shaugh-
nessy, 146 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), ajff'd mem.,
245 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1957).
15 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953).
16 United States ex rel. Lue Chow Yee v. Shaugh-
nessy, 146 F. Supp. 3, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
17 Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925).
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for her deportation was ordered. Ordinarily,
naturalization of parents affects minor chil-
dren who are dwelling within the United
States. The Kaplan girl was held to be
merely a parolee because she could not
have lawfully landed in the country due
to her feeble-mindedness, and therefore
could not have "dwelt within the United
States."' 8 That parole into the United
States does not transform an excluded alien
into a resident alien entitled to due process
has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
as recently as June 1958.19
In the light of prior case law and the
statute now in force,20 the decision in favor
of a hearing for Paktorovics despite his
parole status is truly remarkable and indi-
cates a revolutionary departure from pre-
vious authority.21 At first glance the deci-
sion seems reasonable, but there is weighty
support for the government's position. The
power to exclude is based on the sovereign's
power and need to protect itself from inva-
18 Ibid. Cf. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaugh-
nessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). In this case the alien
wife of an American soldier, seeking entry under
the War Brides Act (ch. 591, 59 STAT. 659
(1945)), was excluded by the Attorney General
without a hearing although the effect of this would
be to deprive the husband of his own citizenship
if he wished to live with his wife.
"1Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
20 "The Attorney General may in his discretion
parole into the United States temporarily under
such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent
reasons . . . any alien applying for admission to
the United States, but such parole of such alien
shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien
and when the purposes of such parole shall ...
have been served the alien shall forthwith return
• . . to the custody from which he was paroled
and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt
with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States."
66 STAT. 188 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1182 (d) (5)
(1953). (Emphasis added.)
21 The Court in the instant case stated: "If this
means an extension of the doctrine that aliens as
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sion. A curtailment of that power by re-
quiring a hearing for persons paroled into
the country, with the possible exposure of
confidential sources of information, could
be dangerous. The question of individual
rights versus national security is a delicate
one, and it is possible that this decision
creates more problems than it solves. If the
Hungarian parolees can be considered sui
generis, surely other groups will seek a
like distinction. It may be difficult to devise




A novel question concerning the deducti-
b ility of charitable bequests was presented
in Estate of Dichtel.1 The testator made a
cash bequest to his daughter, a member of
a religious order and resident of a convent.
The estate claimed a tax deduction, alleg-
ing that the decedent believed the money
would be transferred to the order. The Court
denied this claim on the ground of insuffi-
cient evidence of the nature of the legatee's
obligation so to transfer the bequest and of
the testator's awareness of that obligation.
Though not answered in the case at bar, an
interesting question is posed concerning
the allowability of the deduction if facts
were presented indicating that the religious
was under a strict obligation to transfer
well as citizens are entitled to the protection of
procedural due process in deportation proceedings
so as to include within the protected class of
persons parolees who have come to the United
States as have the Hungarian refugees of whom
appellant is merely one of thousands, we do not
hesitate to take that forward step, in view of all
the circumstances of this case ... " 260 F.2d at
614. (Emphasis added.)
1 Estate of Dichtel v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. No.
133 (September 26, 1958).
the bequest to the order, and that the tes-
tator knew of this obligation.
Section 812 (d) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 provides that there shall be
deducted from the value of the gross estate
the "amount of all bequests, legacies, de-
vises, or transfers, to or for the use of .. .
charities. 2 The question is thus dependent
on whether or not the legatee, though the
absolute recipient of the bequest, was under
a duty to transfer it to the order, and if so,
whether the transfer was the type recog-
nized by the Code.
Gifts for charitable or religious purposes
have enjoyed a privileged position in the
law of testamentary disposition.3 If the
intention to make such a gift pervades and
dominates the whole bequest, though there
be no formal gift in trust, a charitable trust
will be implied.4 In the instant case there
are no precatory words in the will, nor
can a charitable intent be inferred from the
instrument as a whole. Nevertheless, in
cases concerning similar absolute bequests
the courts have, on occasion, imposed on
the legatee an obligation in the nature of a
constructive trust.5
In order to establish a constructive trust
where the will states that the devisee or
legatee is to take the property for his own
benefit, the intent of the testator to create a
trust must be communicated to the legatee.0
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2055 is not relevantly
different.
3 Matter of Durbrow, 245 N.Y. 469, 157 N.E.
747 (1927).
4 See, e.g., Girard Trust Co. v. Russel, 179 Fed.
446 (3d Cir. 1910).
5 See, e.g., Clark v. Tibbetts, 167 F.2d 397 (2d
Cir. 1948); Shields v. McAuley, 37 Fed. 302
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1888). See also Delaney v. Gard-
ner, 204 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1953), wherein a
trust imposed by a lower court was recognized.
6 Flood v. Ryan, 220 Pa. 450, 69 Atl. 908 (1908);
Schultz's Appeal, 80 Pa. 396 (1876).
Likewise, it is an essential element of the
trust that the legatee agree to convey the
property to the third party.7 There need be
no express agreement by the legatee. If the
testator communicates his intention to him,
absent his express refusal to do so, it will
ordinarily be inferred that -he agreed to
carry it out.s The basis for making these
agreements part of the testator's will,
although they have not been executed and
attested in the manner prescribed by the
statute of wills,9 is the theory that the lega-
tee would otherwise be perpetrating a fraud
upon the testator and his intended bene-
ficiaries.' 0
On applying these rules to the case at
hand it is clear that it does not fall squarely
within the usual judicial concept of a con-
structive trust. There is neither the commu-
nicated intent of the testator nor acquies-
cence by the legatee. On the other hand,
neither is the case so distinguishable as not
to be at least analogous. For the awareness
by the testator of the obligation to surren-
der the bequest, once established, may be
considered as amounting to an intent, and
the fact of the obligation as amounting to
an agreement by the legatee to convey the
property. Understanding of this may be
aided by considering the problem from the
nature of the obligation or vows of the
religious.
7 See Delaney v. Gardner, 204 F.2d 855 (Ist Cir.
1953), reversing 103 F. Supp. 610 (D.C. Mass.
1952); accord, Colgrove v. Goodyear, 325 Mich.
127, 37 N.W.2d 779 (1949).
8Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N.Y. 282, 45
N.E. 876 (1897).
9 See N. Y. DECED. EST. LAW §21; 1 SCOTT,
TRUSTS §55.1, at 395-97 (2d ed. 1956).
"0 See, e.g., Matter of Will of O'Hara, 95 N.Y.
403 (1884); Barron v. Stuart, 136 Ark. 481, 207
S.W. 22 (1918); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS §55.1, at 395
(2d ed. 1956).
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The entrance of a son or daughter into
the religious life is an event of deep signifi-
cance in the Catholic home. It is undoubt-
edly preceded by much discussion and
questioning as to the nature and rules of
the community. The father is aware, for
he probably -must provide for it, that a
woman contemplating vows must have a
dowry before the taking of the habit." His
interest in the welfare of his child, primed
in part by the fact that the dowry he is
paying may be used by her should she
leave the order, 12 will probably be mani-
fested by his examination of the nature of
her vows. He would learn that a corollary
of this necessity of dower is the right of
ownership. A professed of simple vows, as
contrasted with solemn vows, keeps the
ownership of her property and the right to
acquire more unless the constitutions of the
order state the contrary. 13 Since the father
knows these facts, even if he intended to
benefit the order, a constructive trust would
not arise upon the bequest to his daughter,
for he neither expressed his intent nor
exacted a promise from the legatee. To
impose a constructive trust on the absolute
recipient of the bequest in such circum-
stances would be a flagrant violation of the
statute of wills. 14 It is clear, then, that when
a bequest is made to one under simple
vows it is a direct gift to her and no tax
deduction should be allowed the estate.
This would not be true where the re-
ligious is under solemn vows. One pro-
fessed of solemn vows15 is incapable of
possessing or acquiring property. All prop-
erty that this religious does acquire accrues
11 CODEX IoUtS CANONICI, Can. 547, §§1, 2.
12 Can. 551, §1.
'sCan. 580, §1.
14 See note 9 supr ,,
25 Can. 582, §1.
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to the order.16 It is fair to assume, because
of the seriousness of these vows and the
infrequency of their application, that the
father of a solemn professed is fully aware
of their existence. If he does not know of
them at the outset of his child's professed
life, he could reasonably be expected to
learn of them when contemplating the mak-
ing of his will. In some orders, the vows
are simple, so that the members retain
capacity for ownership, but the constitu-
tions command that all property acquired
be surrendered to the order.1 7 Thus, could
it not be said that when a testator makes a
bequest, knowing that his legatee has made
solemn vows or is bound by such constitu-
tions, he really intends the legacy for the
use of the order? Could not the awareness
of so firm an obligation amount to an
intent?
And unless a desire to the contrary is
communicated to the testator, could not the
fact of the obligation amount to an agree-
ment by the legatee to hold the property
for the benefit of the order? It is submitted
that although the elements of a constructive
trust are not present in their usual form,
because of the relationship of the parties
and the nature of the vows or constitutions
16 Can. 582. But see Can. 488, n. 7, which pro-
vides for religious whose vows, according to the
constitution of their institute, should be solemn,
but which, by Apostolic provision, are simple in
certain regions. "The places in which the direction
of the Holy See referred to in Can. 488, n. 7 is
in force are the following . . . (c) United States
of North America by reason of the decision of the
Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 30 Sept.
1864; but the four monasteries of the Visitation
Nuns at Georgetown, Baltimore, Mobile, and St.
Louis were excepted." SCHAEFER, DE RELIGIOSES
76 (1947).
1 7 Can. 581, §1.
there is an enforceable obligation on the
legatee in the nature of a constructive trust,
an obligation that may be enforced even if
the religious should leave the community.' 8
The question next to be determined con-
cerns the allowance of a tax deduction to
the estate. If section 812 (d) 19 merely pro-
vided for the deduction of "bequests, lega-
cies, [and] devises" to charities, it would
apply only to the normal situation of a
strictly testamentary gift directly to charity.
But the statute also includes "transfers...
for the use of" charities, which covers the
transfer of money from an estate to a char-
ity by the device of a constructive trust.20
Thus when a bequest is made to a religious
under solemn vows, or one under simple
vows but subject to the constitutions men-
tioned above, 21 a deduction would seem to
be authorized by the Code.
18 Cf. Townley v. Province of the Holy Name, 25
F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1938), was a suit by a
priest to have his order declared trustee, for his
benefit, of property he had transferred to it. The
court granted judgment for the religious order,
declaring that the property had been conveyed to
it under the provisions of the canon law and the
constitution of the order.
1 0 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §812 (d). INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §2055 is not relevantly different.
20 Marine Midland Trust Co. v. McGowan, 223
F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1955), where the court held
that a constructive trust falls squarely within the
definition of transfers to the use of charities, and
hence allowed a tax deduction. Contra, Delaney
v. Gardner, 204 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1953), where
the court denied a deduction on the ground that
the charities were not disclosed in the will.
21 Since this is a bequest for religious purposes it
would come within the limitations imposed by
section 17 of the Decedent Estate Law. This sec-
tion provides that no more than half the net estate
can be bequeathed for religious purposes if an
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